Introduction
In recent times, a growing number of studies have been devoted to examining individual environmental preferences. Initial interest in environmental attitudes goes back to the early 1970s (Bord and O'Connor, 1997 ). An increasing number of economists have been involved in evaluating whether an individual's environmental morale or attitudes could help to reduce environmental degradation or the problems of free riding associated with public goods (Frey and Stutzer, 2006) . One possible solution is to 'force' people to cooperate. This is in line with deterrence policy based on the economics-of-crime approach. Expected utility is maximized, taking into account the probability of detection and the degree of punishment. However, empirical and experimental findings indicate that deterrence models predict too little compliance. People are more compliant than these models predict. The level of compliance observed cannot be explained by the amount of risk aversion involved. The literature suggests that social norms help us to explain the high degree of compliance (Torgler, 2007) .
The high level of individual co-operation has been documented in the experimental literature.
According to Ochs and Roth (1989) and Roth (1995) , a large number of ultimatum experiments have shown that the modal offer is (50, 50) , that the mean offer is somewhere around (40, 60) , and that the smaller the offer, the higher the probability that the offer will be rejected. According to Ledyard (1995) and Davis and Holt (1993) , public good experiments indicate that, on average, subjects contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment to a public good.
Prevailing social norms thus tend to generate increased individual cooperation in public good situations and, in some instances, of private goods as well. Violation of social norms has negative consequences, such as internal sanctions (e.g. guilt, remorse) or external legal and social sanctions, such as gossip and ostracism. As Polinsky and Shavell (2000) point out, the corresponding literature focuses on the influence that social norms have on individual behavior, and their role as a substitute for, or a supplement to, formal laws. Laws themselves can influence social norms. Rege and Telle (2001) suggest that social norms may explain why many individuals don't litter public places. If littering is not acceptable in a society, a "person throwing his ice-cream-paper on the street will feel social disapproval from people observing him… many people do not litter even if they know that nobody is observing them, because littering imposes a feeling of guilt" (p. 3). Feelings of guilt or shame restrict behavior.
Many traditional models have treated public cooperation as an isolated case.
However, subjects do not normally act as isolated individuals playing a game against nature. This paper emphasizes the relevance of social context in understanding the willingness of individuals to keep the environment clean. The behavior of other citizens is important to understand why people comply. As a consequence, theories of pro-social behavior, which take the impact of behavior or the preferences of others into account, are promising. The concept of pro-social behavior is widely implemented into daily life. For example, Vesterlund (2003) reports that charitable organizations have an incentive to ask donors who make large contributions to permit the use of their name when a donation is made. Such an announcement is likely to have a positive effect on others who have not yet made a contribution. It also helps to reduce the problem of free-riding and encourages individuals to make larger contributions.
Individuals may be willing to contribute conditionally, depending on the pro-social behavior of others. This applies to an individual's environmental actions as well. The more others are perceived to comply, the more willing individuals are to protect the environment.
We hypothesize that the extent to which others contribute triggers more or less cooperation and systematically influences the willingness to participate in environmental actions or contributions. We use survey data to test whether conditional cooperation can be identified for environmental actions as well.
To our knowledge, our paper provides findings not yet discussed in previous environmental research. There is no study that investigates whether conditional cooperation is relevant in the environmental economics literature. It remains uncertain whether previous results in laboratory experiments or field experiments are directly transferable in a context that deals with environmental aspects. The paper also complements previous studies by providing evidence outside of a lab setting, using a wide-ranging survey that covers 30
Western and Eastern European countries.
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the existing literature on social comparisons. In Section 3, we present our theoretical approach and develop our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical results. In Section 5, we discuss the potential causality problems and Section 6 concludes with a summary and discussion of the main results.
Overview of the literature
Several theories have been put forward to explain what constitutes conditional cooperation.
Most papers in the literature (cf. Rabin, 1998 and Fehr, 2002) explain conditional cooperation in terms of reciprocity. In an environmental context, reciprocity means, for example, that if many citizens don't throw litter in a public place, other individuals would feel obliged to do likewise. Several laboratory experimental studies (mainly public good experiments) provide evidence on pro-social behavior (for an overview, see Gächter, 2006) . For example, Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) find that 50 percent of the subjects were conditionally cooperative. Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter (2003) create a laboratory situation in which each subject is a member of two economically identical groups, where only the group members are different. They observe that the same subjects contribute different amounts, depending on the behavior of the group. Contributions are larger when group cooperation is higher.
Alternatively, the concept of conformity (cf. Henrich, 2004) has been used to explain conditional cooperation. Conformity refers to the motivation of individuals to fulfill the social norms of keeping the environment clean and therefore acting according to society's rules. This concept is less connected to incentives and benefits than is reciprocity. In this case, individuals would contribute, even if the good in question does not benefit anyone, as long as it is perceived that a sufficient number of individuals are contributing (Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2006) .
While several early studies provide evidence of conditional cooperation within a laboratory setting, an increasing number of studies have been conducted to check the validity of such studies outside of a laboratory setting. Frey and Meier (2004a) provide field experimental evidence of conditional cooperation. They analyze students' decisions regarding contributions to two social funds administered by the University of Zurich. Their study shows that, when more individuals expect others to cooperate, they are more willing to cooperate. In another study, Frey and Meier (2004b) observe that the strongest reaction to information about others' behavior is observed in students who are uncertain whether or not to contribute to two Public Funds at their University. Heldt (2005) conducts a natural field experiment on conditional cooperation, in which cross-country skiers in two Swedish ski resorts are faced with the decision of whether or not to contribute to ski track funding. The results suggest that the percentage of subjects making a contribution is higher when they know that a higher percentage of individuals are making a contribution. Shang and Croson (2005) conducted a field experiment at an anonymous public radio station during an on-air fundraising campaign to investigate the influence of social information on the size of an individual's contribution. The results indicate that social information does indeed influence contributions. Martin and Randal (2005) conducted another natural field experiment at an art gallery. Admission was free, but a donation could be placed in a transparent box in the foyer.
The results showed that visitors donate significantly more when there is already some money in the box.
The study of pro-social behavior resulting from perceived public cooperation is an area that has largely been ignored in the environmental economics literature, despite its potential to affect environmental outcomes. The connection between perceived environmental cooperation of other individuals and environmental morale or preferences has not yet been studied in the environmental economics literature. In contrast, studies linking improved environmental behavior, or higher willingness to pay for environmental preservation with education, knowledge, environmental awareness and prior experience are well established in the environmental economics literature (cf. Tisdell and Wilson, 2001 ). This may be explained by the unavailability of quality survey data, although the concept itself may not be new to researchers in environmental economics. For the first time, the European Value Survey (EVS) provides quality survey data, asking the relevant questions to enable this study to be undertaken.
Pro-social behavior occurs voluntarily. Such behavior is not only linked with public goods but also with particular private goods. The crucial feature here is that an individual acts according to the way the majority of the public is acting, and not because he or she benefits directly from such action. Hence, any strategies to increase pro-social behavior have the potential to improve environmental and social outcomes in a cost effective manner.
In everyday life, there are many environmental outcomes that can be improved through enhanced pro-social actions. We demonstrate the relationship between an individual's perceptions of the public not throwing away litter in public places and an increase in the individual's willingness to also protect the environment. Other areas where such behavior is useful are, for example, conserving energy and water, contributing to environmental conservation, reducing car pollution and other forms of pollution, engaging in wildlife friendly gardening, becoming members of environmental organizations and taking part in working bees. In fact, the number of environmental activities that can benefit from pro-social behavior is endless.
This study looks at the disposal of litter to examine whether individual behavior is influenced by their perception of how other people behave. Despite litter in public places being recognized as a major public health and safety hazard and diminishing the aesthetic appearance of public places (cf. Ackerman, 1997) , few studies have focused on dealing with this issue. Litter and unkempt lawns have also been linked with crime (cf. Brown et al., 2004) . Existing studies examine the role that education can play in reducing public litter (cf. Taylor et al., 2007) , and the instruments (e.g. taxes, fines, charges and market incentives) that can be used to minimize the problem of public littering (cf. Fullerton and Wolverton, 2000; Ackerman, 1997; Dobbs, 1991) . One study (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1994) , dealing with garbage recycling, examines why some households participate in curbside recycling programs, even in the absence of a user fee; why other households do not participate, even in the presence of a user fee; and why some households choose to litter while others do not.
However, that paper deals with user fees and does not address the issue of conditional cooperation in littering behavior. University coordinates the project and provides the guidelines to guarantee the use of standardized information in the surveys and the national representativeness of the data. To avoid framing biases, the questions are asked in a prescribed order. The response rates vary from country to country. However, the average response rate is around 60 percent.
Empirical approach
Because EVS asks an identical set of questions in various European countries, the survey provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of conditional cooperation on environmental morale and preferences. This paper considers 30 representative national samples of at least 1,000 individuals in each country. The survey permits us to work with a representative set of individuals, covering a large set of countries. The data allows us to complement previous laboratory and field experiments with survey studies to demonstrate the existence of conditional cooperation.
Dependent variables and conditional cooperation
To check the robustness of results, we use two dependent variables. The first measures an individual's willingness to keep public places free from litter. This variable is identified as (a particular case of) environmental morale. To assess the level of environmental morale, we use the following question:
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it is always justified, never justified, or somewhere in between: … Throwing away litter in a public place.
A ten-scale index is used for this question, with the two extremes being 'never justified' and 'always justified'. The natural cut-off point is the value 1, where a high amount of respondents assert that throwing away litter in a public place is 'never justified' (68.3 percent). Thus, our environmental morale variable takes the value 1 if the respondent says that throwing away litter in a public place is 'never justified', and zero otherwise.
The second variable is an index on environmental preferences, covering the following two survey questions:
I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree)
The index adds the values of both questions, which gives total values between 0 and 6.
In general, the EVS has been designed as a wide-ranging survey, where the danger of framing effects is reduced compared to many other surveys that focus entirely on environmental questions. The available data are based on self-reports, so that subjects may tend to overstate their degree of cooperation. However, the questions are not free of problems. The level of improvement in environmental quality is not clearly stated. Hence, people do not know exactly how much they have to pay for a particular improvement 1 . The consequences of taxation are not mentioned either (first question). No information is provided as to how much the income or value added taxes, or other taxes, are supposed to be increased. It is thus unclear who will have to bear the highest tax burden. While unspecified payment schemes increase the variance, they may influence the willingness to contribute (Witzke and Urfei, 2001 ). However, an unspecified statement still helps in measuring environmental preferences and the value attributed to reduce strategic behavior by influencing the quantity or quality of environmental goods. People may intentionally indicate a false willingness to contribute in order to match their own preferences (Hidano et al., 2005) .
When neither specific goods nor quantitative values are used, the attributes of the environmental goods in question need not be thoroughly explained to ensure that respondents understand and respond by stating their willingness to accept an increase in taxes or to give away part of their income 2 .
We use the following question as an independent variable to investigate the impact of conditional cooperation.
"According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Throwing away litter in a public place?" (4=almost all, 1=almost none)
In general, we observe an increased interest among economists to use survey data. For example, research that deals with social capital, corruption, happiness and tax compliance explore the causes of attitudes using other attitudinal variables as independent factors (cf. Diener and Suh, 2000; Brewer and Steenbergen, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; Brewer et al., 2004; and Chang and Chu, 2006 and Torgler, 2007) . In this paper, we investigate the correlation 1 It has been shown that the preferences to protect the environment (regarding causes and consequences of environmental damages) depend on the level of information included in the questionnaire (Bulte et al., 2005) .
2 For a detailed discussion regarding possible survey biases, see Carson and Mitchell (1995) .
between perceived compliance and environmental morale or attitudes in a multivariate analysis controlling for other factors in order to better isolate the relationship. A specification based on multivariate analysis has the obvious advantage of presenting a more balanced view of the role of conditional cooperation by separating the effects of other exogenous variables.
However, if conditional cooperation differs systematically in some other way that also affects the willingness to cooperate, the results could be misleading.
Econometric results
Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables. Previous research in environmental economics and social norms demonstrates the relevance to consider sociodemographic and socio-economic variables along with the level of church attendance, formal and informal education and participation in an environmental organization (cf. Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007 (2003) and Alm et al. (2006) show that such circumstances have an impact on social norms. we exclude income. This is because the ten-point income scale in the EVS is based on national currencies, which reduces the possibility of comparing nations in a cross-country comparison. 4 The self-classification of the respondents' economic situation into various economic classes may be used as a proxy. However, data for this purpose has not been collected in all countries. Thus, we include economic status sequentially in the specification (see Table 2 ). In general, a probit estimation is appropriate when working with our first dependent variable (ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE) and an ordered probit model when 
The results obtained using the variable INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL
PREFERENCES is consistent with the literature on environmental attitudes and preferences.
Several studies stress that age is negatively correlated with the willingness to contribute to additional environmental protection, since older people are unlikely to enjoy the long-term benefits of preserving resources (Whitehead, 1991; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2000) .
Our results also indicate a negative correlation between age and environmental preferences.
The reference group (AGE below 30 years) has the strongest environmental preferences and the marginal effects increase consistently for higher age groups. 6 Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, practically never or never (8= more than once a week to 1=practically never or never).
In a meta-study, Zelezny et al. (2000) find strong evidence that environmentalism does not begin in adulthood, which contradicts the statement that gender differences arise due to motherhood and child protection. Regardless of age, women show more concern for the environment than men. In our analysis, we observe strong gender differences. Being a woman rather than a man increases the probability of reporting the highest environmental preferences by 0.6 percentage points (see Table 1 ). The beta coefficients indicate a strong quantitative effect relative to other variables.
Regarding educational issues, the literature shows that formal education 7 has a significant positive influence on environmental willingness to contribute (Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Engel and Pötschke, 1998; Witzke and Urfei, 2001; Veisten et al., 2004) .
On the other hand, informal education is also important (Whitehead, 1991; Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2000; Hidano et al., 2005) . Wellinformed citizens are more aware of environmental issues and problems and have stronger environmental attitudes, because they are more knowledgeable about the possible damage (Danielson et al., 1995; Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007) . The strength of formal and informal education is also visible in Tables 1 and 2 8 . All respective coefficients are statistically significant and show considerable quantitative effects.
The economic situation of an individual is also a significant aspect (Whitehead, 1991; Stevens et al., 1994; Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Popp, 2001; Witzke and Urfei, 2001; Bulte et al., 2005; Dupont, 2004; Veisten et al., 2004; Hidano et al., 2005) . These studies show a positive relationship between income and a preference to contribute to environmental causes. Our study also points to a positive relationship between lower income classes and lower environmental values. However, the marginal effects for the variables UPPER CLASS and MIDDLE CLASS are similar.
In line with Veisten et al. (2004) , unemployed people are found to have lower preferences for environmental protection. Finally, marital status might influence environmental attitudes as well. It can be argued that married people are more compliant or more concerned about environmental degradation than others, especially compared to singles.
They are more constrained by their social network and are often strongly involved with the community (Tittle, 1980) . This argument also holds true when focusing on moral attitudes or, in our case, environmental morale. Overall, the estimates indicate a tendency for married individuals to have relatively high environmental preferences and high levels of environmental morale, although the differences are not always statistically significant.
In general, the results on environmental morale are in line with the literature on social norms or morality, such as tax morale (cf. Torgler, 2007) . Age is positively correlated with environmental morale and the economic situation is negatively correlated. Consistent with the literature on environmental preferences, a gender effect is observable. Education is statistically significant in Table 1 . However, once the economic situation of the individual is controlled for, the coefficient is insignificant.
In sum, the first two tables provide evidence to demonstrate the existence of individual conditional cooperation in relation to environmental issues.
Causality
Causality remains an issue, because one's own attitudes may lead to the expectation that others behave in the same way. However, results from 'strategy method' experiments conducted by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2006) Table 3 shows that the instruments and the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regression are statistically significant. Consistent with our main hypothesis, the estimation results indicate that the lower the perceived environmental cooperation of other persons, the lower the environmental morale and environmental preferences. environmental morale or preferences) could lead to the expectation that others would also behave in the same way. Thus, individuals with a higher environmental morale or preferences have a lower perception of others not cooperating or contributing. To deal with this possibility, the first step is to calculate the average perceived environmental cooperation for each country. The next step is to calculate the average perceived environmental cooperation in each country for individuals having the highest environmental morale 11 or environmental preferences. In a further step, the difference between the two average values is considered.
These values may measure a particular bias in perceived environmental cooperation due to the level of environmental morale or preferences. This bias is then added to the individual values of the group with the highest environmental morale and preferences. As a consequence, the values between the group with higher and lower environmental morale and preferences are brought closer to together, depending on the perceived environmental cooperation in each country. This procedure may help to better isolate the existence of a conditional cooperative effect. Table 4 presents the results for the filtered perceived environmental cooperation variable. The results remain robust. Only in specification (10) do we observe that the z-value is below the 10 percent level. However, once the economic situation of the individual is included in the specification, the coefficient remains statistically significant at the 10 percent level and similar marginal effects are obtained.
Conclusions
This paper investigates whether perceived environmental cooperation by the public is an important determinant of explaining environmental morale and environmental preferences of individuals. Our hypothesis is that an individual's behavior is likely to be influenced by their perception of the behavior of other citizens. For example, if an individual believes that 11 Value 1, stressing that throwing away litter in a public place is never justifiable.
throwing litter in a public place is common, then the environmental morale or preference of the individual decreases. Alternatively, if an individual believes others to be compliant, then the environmental morale/preference increases. Using recent EVS data for Western and Eastern European countries, we find strong empirical support for the hypothesis. The results remain robust using 11 different specifications and after dealing with potential causality issues.
By investigating the public's littering and environmental preferences, the paper underlines the importance of using a rich set of theories to fully understand what influences people's willingness to contribute towards improving outcomes. Individuals indeed do not act in isolation.
To our knowledge, this is the first study of this nature demonstrating the relationship between perceived environmental cooperation of others and the environmental morale in the form of not littering public places and willingness to protect the environment. This Prob > chi2 / Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, LOWEST CLASS, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Prob > F 0.000 0.000 Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, LOWEST CLASS, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
